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Political Approaches to Voting ‘No’
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A B S T R A C T
In June 2005, 61.5% of the Dutch voted ‘nee’ in the refer-
endum on the European constitution. In the present contri-
bution I test hypotheses from the national identity, utilitarian
and political approaches to explain this voting behaviour. I
collected data in the Netherlands to test whether one of
those approaches has been decisive in explaining the refer-
endum outcome. I also provide information about whether
specific EU evaluations from these approaches explain the
voting behaviour, thus bringing in the discussion on the
importance of domestic political evaluations (second-order
election effects). I also test hypotheses on which theoretical
approach explains differences between social categories in
rejecting the constitution. My results show that specifically
EU evaluations in particular accounted for the ‘no’ vote,
although in conjunction with a strong effect from domestic
political evaluations. I also find evidence for ‘party-following
behaviour’ irrespective of people’s attitudes. Utilitarian
explanations determine the ‘no’ vote less well than political
or national identity explanations. The strongest impact on
voting ‘no’ came from a perceived threat from the EU to
Dutch culture.
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Introduction
In June 2005, the Netherlands said ‘no’ to the European constitution. With
61.5% of the vote, the Dutch rejection of the constitution was even more
resounding than the French. It was also more of a surprise, despite the fact
that polls had predicted a ‘no’ vote. From Eurobarometer research the Dutch
public is known for its positive attitude toward EU membership (Norris,
1999). Though increasing scepticism is reported since the early 1990s, even in
the month prior to the referendum 64% agreed that EU membership is a good
thing, which made the Dutch among the most positive in Europe (European
Commission, 2007). It is hence of interest to test which specific national or EU
concerns motivated the Dutch ‘no’.
Many of the explanations given for the referendum results refer to the
campaign (Aarts and Van der Kolk, 2005; Lucardie, 2005; De Vreese, 2006), but
there were specific content-related explanations as well. A popular interpret-
ation of the vote among left-wing political parties is the claim that ‘people
really want a different Europe, one that is more social and less bureaucratic’
(GreenLeft, 2006). Another explanation relates to the sovereignty and identity
of the Netherlands. In an expanding Union, so the explanation goes, the
Netherlands would disappear from the map. This fear was captured on a
campaign poster produced by the Dutch Socialist Party, in which the
Netherlands had disappeared into the North sea (Socialist Party, 2006). Finally,
people were said to have turned their backs on the EU because of the prospec-
tive membership of Turkey, an issue with which Dutch politician Wilders and
his anti-Islam Party for Freedom allied themselves through the ‘No to Turkey’
campaign (PVV, 2006). Many of these single elucidations are related to the
discussion on the importance of three overarching explanations for Euro-
scepticism and voting in referendums on EU topics: people are assumed to be
driven by either economic, political or threatened-identity motives (Anderson
and Reichert, 1996; Gabel, 1998; Ehin, 2001; Christin and Trechsel, 2002; Díez
Medrano, 2003; De Vreese and Boomgaarden, 2005; Hooghe and Marks, 2005;
Luedtke, 2005; McLaren, 2006; Lubbers and Scheepers, 2007). Attention to such
EU evaluations do arouse suspicion that referendum results are determined by
issue voting, as has been shown in studies on referendums in Denmark and
Ireland (Svensson, 2002; Garry et al., 2005), and that ‘second-order election’
explanations, i.e. evaluations of national politics being decisive in referendum
voting, are of less importance (Franklin et al., 1994; Franklin, 2002; Garry et al.,
2005). Moreover, it makes apparent that a general EU evaluation explanation
will not suffice. It is hence of importance to separate effects from EU attitudes
according to the domains of the economy, politics and threatened identity.
For the Netherlands, it has become clear that those parties with a ‘no’
campaign – all on the fringes of the political spectrum: Wilders’ Party for
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Freedom and the List Pim Fortuyn, the small Christian parties and the
Socialist Party – represented a larger proportion of Dutch voters in the refer-
endum than they did after the parliamentary elections in 2002 and 2003
(Crum, 2007). The question remains of whether it was dissatisfaction with
Dutch politics that drove the majority to the ‘no’ vote (a second-order election
effect), or whether it can be explained by specific attitudes and specific EU
evaluations. The role of identity and cultural explanations, as well as
economic and political explanations, will be more thoroughly addressed than
has been done previously. Prior contributions have corroborated a relation
between anti-immigrant attitudes and Euroscepticism (McLaren, 2001, 2006;
Hooghe and Marks, 2005; Luedtke, 2005; De Vreese and Boomgaarden, 2005).
Few of these studies included both dimensions of ethnocentrism: a positive
in-group attitude and a negative out-group attitude. Moreover, I include 
the relationship with the perceived threat from Muslims as an aspect of the
identity approach.
I propose disentangling the degree to which the voting in the EU refer-
endum was affected by general attitudes on national identity, economics and
politics or by attitudes specifically related to an evaluation of the EU on these
three aspects. To summarize, I first study the extent to which differences exist
between social groups in the degree to which they voted against the European
constitution. Second, I show how much the political, utilitarian and identity
approaches explain with regard to both the differences between social groups
and the voting behaviour itself.
Theories and hypotheses
Turning to theories to explain the voting in the referendum, I propose follow-
ing both research on earlier EU referendums and the literature on Euro-
scepticism (Gabel, 1998; Hooghe and Marks, 2005). In general, the theories
can be divided into three overarching approaches. Two of them have been
dominant, making a distinction between utilitarian or economic accounts and
political explanations (Gabel, 1998; Sánchez-Cuenca, 2000). Where the former
explanations emphasize the outcome of a cost–benefit evaluation as crucial
for people’s attitudes towards the EU, the latter focus on the importance of
political knowledge and trust. A third tradition that has recently received
wide attention can be designated as the national identity approach. Here the
importance attached to the nation-state is at the centre of the explanation
(Duchesne and Frognier, 1995; Deflem and Pampel, 1996; De Master and 
Le Roy, 2000; Carey, 2002; Christin and Trechsel, 2002; Hooghe and Marks,
2005; Luedtke, 2005; McLaren, 2006).
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Threatened identity approach
The body of literature on nationalist sentiments related to ‘keeping the EU
out’ has only recently been growing. De Master and Le Roy (2000: 419) were
among the first to emphasize motivations of Euroscepticism related to ‘preser-
vation of national integrity or fear of foreign influences’. The body of litera-
ture expanded rapidly, showing strong relationships between in-group
favouritism, anti-immigrant attitudes and Euroscepticism (McLaren, 2002,
2006; Luedtke, 2005; Hooghe and Marks, 2005; Lubbers and Scheepers, 2007).
De Vreese and Boomgaarden (2005) have shown that anti-immigrant attitudes
are also very important in explaining the ‘no’ vote in a hypothetical refer-
endum on EU enlargement. The question remains of whether anti-immigrant
attitudes and Eurosceptic attitudes are the outcome of the same process or
whether they influence each other. From identification theory (Tajfel and
Turner, 1979), the expectation is that people differentiate between an in-group
and out-groups to categorize and simplify the world and to derive a positive
social identity. Hence a positive in-group identification based on nationality
could be threatened by further EU integration as well as by immigration.
I follow McLaren (2006) in distinguishing between a perceived threat to
the national culture and a perceived threat to the national economy, where the
former refers to the identity approach and the latter to the economic approach.
Though previous research has shown that both dimensions of threat are
strongly correlated (Sniderman et al., 2004; Ivarsflaten, 2005; Lubbers and
Güveli, 2007), it also revealed that these dimensions have different effects. The
cultural ethnic threat turned out to be even stronger than the economic ethnic
threat in terms of voting for populist parties and of prejudice. McLaren (2006)
comes to a similar conclusion in her study on Euroscepticism. Using the
identity approach, I then test to what extent specific EU evaluations regard-
ing cultural threat or general attitudes of in-group favouritism and cultural
ethnic threat are decisive in explaining the ‘no’ vote in the referendum on the
EU constitution.
Next to the general attitude of cultural ethnic threat, I propose focusing
on attitudes towards Muslims. Turkey’s membership of the EU was referred
to explicitly by the ‘no’ camp in its campaign. This was often motivated by
the argument that Europe has a Christian tradition and should not welcome
Islamic Turkey. The question, again, is to what extent – if at all – it was a
general attitude towards Muslims that made people vote ‘no’ in the refer-
endum, or a more specific attitude towards Turkey’s membership.
Utilitarian approach
According to Gabel (1998), the utilitarian approach has been most successful
in explaining whether people believe that EU membership is good or bad.
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This is indicated by a strong effect of individual perceptions of whether the
country benefits from membership. People experience different costs and
benefits from membership and are therefore expected to differ in their atti-
tudes towards the European Union (Gabel and Palmer, 1995) and conse-
quently in voting in the referendum. Following Anderson (1998) and De
Vreese and Boomgaarden (2005), a negative economic evaluation should
induce Euroscepticism and, as a result, would increase the likelihood of
voting ‘no’ as well. Moreover, as touched upon in the identity approach, a
perceived economic threat from immigrants is expected to induce a ‘no’ vote
too. Even though the referendum on the constitution was not about Europe’s
enlargement, the opening of borders could be perceived as threatening to
economic perspectives, thus increasing the likelihood of people turning their
back on the EU and voting ‘no’ to the European constitution.
Another point of criticism that was often heard in the referendum
campaigns relates to Europe’s money-sucking bureaucracy. It was especially
on this point that earlier, in the 2004 European elections, Dutch politician Van
Buitenen was able to attract many voters (his ‘Transparent Europe’ party won
7.4% of the vote). Remarkably, this aspect has hardly been accounted for in
research into Euroscepticism and voting in referendums on EU issues.
Economic perspectives are often included (with respondents asked whether
they expect to lose out or whether they expect the country’s economic
condition to deteriorate – Anderson, 1998), but these aspects do not cover the
often-heard criticism of the unwieldy and costly administrative apparatus in
Brussels and Strasbourg. My expectation is that the more fervently people
believe that the EU wastes too much money, the greater the chance that they
voted against the constitution.
Criticism of the liberal market policies of the EU – especially from the
perspective of the political parties on the left – boils down to the idea that
the economically weak groups in society gain little from the EU and further
integration (Socialist Party, 2006; GreenLeft, 2006). The key message from
this perspective is that the EU must first become a social EU before setting
its sights on further integration. The Socialist Party campaigned that a ‘yes’
vote would lead the EU to develop into a neo-liberal super-state, whereas
GreenLeft stated that the EU should invest in its social agenda and reduce
its trust in markets and economic liberalization, although still campaigning
for a ‘yes’ vote. The most logical corollary – that the more ardently a person
believes that the EU should pay greater attention to social issues, the greater
the chances she will have voted against the constitution – deserves nuance
owing to the different positions the left-wing parties took in the campaign.
I shall test whether the evaluation that the EU should pay more attention to
social issues was decisive in the voting outcome.
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Political approach
The general proposition that follows from the political approach is that people
who are less politically informed will subscribe to Euroscepticism more
strongly. This ‘cognitive mobilization’ explanation is derived from Inglehart’s
idea that well-developed skills are needed to understand what the European
Union is about (Inglehart, 1970; Hobolt, 2005). Voters were asked say ‘yes’ or
‘no’ to a 341-page treaty for the establishment of a constitution for Europe,
which for most people constituted a colossal tome of abstract text (Wessel,
2005). Voters in the referendum are therefore likely to have been influenced
by the parties they identify with. Hobolt (2006) and Garry et al. (2005) showed
that party endorsement indeed mattered for the results in the Danish refer-
endum on the Maastricht Treaty: if the party they supported advocated a ‘yes’
vote, the likelihood of people voting ‘yes’ in the referendum increased,
regardless of their attitudes.
Franklin et al. (1994) and De Vreese and Boomgaarden (2006) point to the
importance of domestic political evaluations. Because the national govern-
ment is the institution involved in the treaty negotiations on the European
constitution, trust in national politics will inevitably be part of the voting
behaviour. If people distrust the government or the political establishment, it
is unlikely that they will follow their advice for a ‘yes’. Here the second-order
election hypothesis comes to the fore (Garry et al., 2005): EU referendum
outcomes are a product of evaluations of national politics and politicians, and
not so much of evaluations of European-level institutions. Hence, people
opposing the government or, more generally, people without trust in national
politics would be more likely to have voted ‘no’ (Hug and Sciarini, 2000). In
the Netherlands, in addition to the government parties, two opposition
parties led a ‘yes’ campaign; I shall separate the effect from supporting the
government parties and support for opposition parties running a ‘yes’
campaign.
Karp et al. (2003) showed nonetheless that evaluations of EU institutions
also strongly contribute to explain satisfaction with the EU, even though
evaluations of national democracy had a comparably strong effect. The
hypothesis to be tested is that a ‘no’ vote in the Dutch referendum was 
motivated more strongly by distrust of the national parliament than by
distrust of the European Parliament.
Differences between social categories and interpretation
The first question I raised was to what extent differences between social
categories exist, and to what extent they can be explained by the approaches
outlined above. Previous research has provided evidence that differences in
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Euroscepticism exist particularly between educational and income categories
(Gabel, 1998). All three theoretical traditions provide explanations of why
there is a relationship between education and income and voting ‘no’ in the
referendum. From the identity approach it follows that disadvantaged social
groups are more likely to perceive a threat from ethnic minorities, because
they are more likely to be in direct competition over scarce resources 
(Gijsberts et al., 2004). In the Netherlands, higher-educated and richer people
are much less likely to be confronted with minority members in their neigh-
bourhoods and workplaces and in their children’s schools, making endorse-
ment of a tolerant attitude ‘easier’, so the explanation goes. From the
utilitarian tradition, it is assumed that higher-educated and higher-income
segments of society profit more from the free movement of people and goods
(Ultee, 1989). Eichenberg and Dalton (1993) posited this as the ‘human capital’
and ‘capitalist’ hypotheses. Because these privileged strata have better oppor-
tunities for applying their talents in an international setting than the lower
educated, they are expected to be more favourable towards European inte-
gration (Gabel and Palmer, 1995). Finally, lower-educated people are expected
to have less political interest and therefore have less information about the
Union, which would make them more sceptical and more likely to vote
against a European constitution (Inglehart, 1970). Moreover, an explanation
for the effect of education is likely to be found in the higher levels of politi-
cal distrust among the lower educated.
Another factor I propose to be relevant but that has received hardly any
attention from researchers is the experience people have had of other EU
countries. Experience of other countries or of people from other countries of
the European Union is expected to enlarge knowledge and diminish distance
between European citizens. It is expected to reduce in-group preferences and
out-group fears. I anticipate that, if a person has visited other EU countries,
the chances of her having voted against the constitution will decline, because
she will perceive less of an ethnic threat and less of a cultural threat from
the EU. Finally, I consider denomination, in particular because religious
political parties differed in their campaigning. The conservative Calvinist
parties linked themselves to the ‘no’ camp, whereas the larger confessional
party (the Christian Democrats – the governing party) campaigned for a ‘yes’
vote. I expect the differences between the denominations to be explained by
differences in party preferences, and not so much by different attitudes or
EU evaluations.
My model is presented in Figure 1. I expect the background characteristics
to influence general attitudes in the domains of identity, economy or politics,
and consequently specific EU evaluations in these domains, resulting in a
greater likelihood to vote ‘no’ in the referendum on the EU constitution. In
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previous studies of Euroscepticism, evaluation of EU membership has been
regressed on the attitude toward the benefits of membership for one’s country,
but rarely on other diffuse measures of Euroscepticism. With the help of this
model of voting behaviour, I can establish which EU evaluations have the
strongest relation to the ‘no’ vote. The model also allows us to study (a) the
contribution from the different approaches to explaining the voting behaviour;
(b) the importance of specifically EU evaluations versus general attitudes (and
second-order election effects); and (c) which attitudes explain the relationship
between social background characteristics and voting behaviour.
Data
The data used were collected in the fall of 2005 and early 2006 through Social
and Cultural Trends in the Netherlands (SOCON), a research programme
initiated in the 1970s (Eisinga et al., 2008). The final response rate achieved
was 55.7%. The module on the referendum and the European Union was
administered through a written questionnaire, which respondents were asked
to complete after the oral part of the survey (n = 1164). Although I did look
at the differences between native Dutch respondents and respondents of
foreign origin, I decided to conduct the study only among native Dutch. The
reason is that only native Dutch respondents were asked the questions about
an ethnic threat, attitude towards Muslims and attitude towards the Nether-
lands. It turned out that respondents of foreign origin were significantly more
likely not to have voted in the referendum. Those who did vote did not differ
from the native Dutch in their likelihood of having cast a ‘yes’ or ‘no’ vote.
The 120 respondents of foreign origin, both Western and non-Western, are left
out of consideration in this analysis. Of the remaining 1044 respondents, 
816 reported having voted in the referendum. Although it would also be
interesting to learn the reason why the non-voters did not participate, I
omitted this group from the analyses.
Measurement instruments
Voting in the EU referendum
Respondents were presented with the question of whether they had voted for
or against in the referendum on the European constitution. In the sample,
60.6% reported having voted against the constitution. This is close to the
actual outcome (61.5% against).
Lubbers Regarding the Dutch ‘Nee’ to the European Constitution 6 7
Social structural characteristics
The social structural characteristics were gathered in the oral survey.
Educational level was measured by asking respondents about their highest
level of education completed, with seven categories of responses ranging from
‘no schooling or primary school only’ to ‘university education’. Income was
measured by showing respondents a chart with an income scale. They could
then name the letter that corresponded to their household income. The
minimum (less than €150 net per month) and maximum (more than €8000 net
per month) categories were rarely chosen. I therefore condensed the answers
into five categories: (i) less than €1500 net per month; (ii) €1500–2000; (iii)
€2000–3000; (iv) €3000–4000; and (v) more than €4000. Respondents who did
not want to divulge information about their income were assigned the
average income. I also included a ‘no income reported’ variable to determine
whether this group differed in its voting behaviour from those people who
did report an income. A two-step question was used to ascertain the religious
denomination of the respondents. First, respondents were asked whether they
considered themselves members of a church or religious community. If the
answer was ‘yes’, they were then asked for the particular grouping. I dis-
tinguished people who considered themselves members of the Roman
Catholic Church (20.1%) from those considering themselves members of the
Dutch Protestant Church (10.0%) or a different Protestant church (10.0%). I
omitted the four native Dutch believers who belonged to other churches. Age
and sex were asked directly.
EU experience
To determine the degree to which respondents had had experience of other
EU countries, they were first asked whether they had ever lived in another
EU country, and if so, for how long. I recoded the responses to this question
as a dummy for having lived in another EU country or not: 9.4% had at some
point lived in another EU country for a long or short period. Next, respon-
dents were asked in how many of the other 24 EU countries had they spent
at least two nights. To this end, respondents were presented with a map of
Europe with the EU countries shaded and the Netherlands coloured black.
Before their 16th birthday, 41.3% of the respondents had never been in any
of the other countries of the EU. After their 16th birthday, this was true for
just 3.1%. Specifically, 12.9% had been in 1 or 2 countries; 30.4% had been 
in 3–5 countries; 46.5% in 6–12 countries; and 6.6% had been in more than 
12 countries.
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Sociopolitical attitudes
Sociopolitical attitudes, more than structural characteristics, were subject to
change as a result of the referendum itself or of other events occurring
between the referendum and the time the survey was conducted. Although
attitudes are generally seen as fairly stable, opinions on political issues are
particularly prone to change. Still, I expect many of the measurements
presented below to have remained fairly stable after the referendum, if only
because of the very limited time span that the ‘Europe’ subject still generated
interest after the referendum. What I suggest here, however, is that we can
establish associations and can demonstrate which current attitudes (four
months after the referendum) are most strongly associated with a ‘no’ vote,
but that we cannot prove causal relations. This procedure is followed in much
voter research in which the votes in the most recent elections are chosen as
the dependent variable.
Perceived ethnic threat, attitude towards the Netherlands and attitude
towards Muslims in the Netherlands are measurement scales that were
included in the previous instalments of the SOCON survey, and are
discernible by means of factor analyses (see Table 1). Perceived ethnic threat
is measured with six items that make up a reliable scale (Cronbach’s alpha =
.85). Previous research has already shown that economic and cultural ethnic
threats are not distinguishable by factor analyses (Sniderman et al., 2004;
Lubbers and Güveli, 2007), but also that cultural ethnic threat and economic
ethnic threat have different effects on stereotypes and populist voting, respec-
tively. I therefore distinguish between economic ethnic threat (items 3 and 6)
and cultural ethnic threat (item 4). Attitude towards Muslims is measured
with seven statements that make up a strong scale (Cronbach’s alpha = .88).
Attitude towards the Netherlands was originally measured with four items.
Because one of the items had a rather low communality, I decided to drop it
from the factor analysis. Still, reliability analyses showed a rather weak scale
using the three items as presented in the appendix,1 so I chose to use only
the item referring to Dutch pride as a measurement for national identification.
Economic evaluation was measured by six items. However, factor
analysis revealed that they divide into prospective and current economic
evaluations. Prospective economic evaluation was measured with the items:
‘In the coming years, I expect to afford less’, ‘. . . I will have to adjust my
lifestyle’ and ‘. . . I fear worsened economic prospects’ (Cronbach’s alpha =
.85). Current economic evaluation was measured with: ‘I have difficulties
buying basic necessities’, ‘Sometimes I cannot sleep because of financial
worries’ and ‘I am very dissatisfied with my present income’ (Cronbach’s
alpha = .74). I shall separate these present and prospective economic
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evaluations in the analyses, even though I do not have different hypotheses
about their effects.
Concerning political measurements, respondents were asked straight-
forwardly about their trust in the Dutch parliament. They could give a report
mark between 0 and 10 to indicate the extent of their confidence. The mark
given the Dutch parliament was 5.14. In my research I assumed distrust of
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Table 1 Factor analyses on items concerning ethnic threat, negative attitude
towards Muslims and positive in-group attitude
F1 F2 F3 H 2
I sometimes worry that my living environment is 
deteriorating because of the arrival of ethnic 
minorities – .60 – .40
When it comes to housing allocation, ethnic 
minorities are provided for earlier than the 
native Dutch – .65 – .48
It sometimes goes so far that Dutch people are 
fired so that ethnic minorities can be hired – .74 – .50
The influx of ethnic minorities in the Netherlands 
is a menace to our own culture .21 .52 – .57
Education for the children of ethnic minorities 
comes at the cost of Dutch children – .63 – .51
I sometimes fear that my financial prospects will 
deteriorate because of the presence of ethnic 
minorities – .83 – .62
Muslims raise their children in an authoritative 
manner .56 – – .30
Muslim men dominate their women .79 – – .54
Muslims cut themselves off from Dutch society .65 – – .54
Muslims readily resort to violence to solve their 
problems .60 – – .57
Islamic parents have no control over their children 
outside the private sphere .52 – – .38
Muslims misuse their religion for political purposes .67 – – .56
Most Muslims have no respect for homosexuals .68 – – .41
I am proud to be Dutch – – .68 .43
We Dutch are always willing to pitch in to get a 
job done – – .36 .20
Every citizen of the Netherlands should show 
proper respect for our national symbols, such 
as the flag and the national anthem – – .68 .46
Notes: F = factor loadings from the pattern matrix; H 2 = communality. Only factor loadings > .10
are presented. N = 787.
Source: Socon, 2005 (Eisinga et al., 2008).
the parliament. For the remainder of the study, I coded the measurement in
such a way that a high score indicates strong distrust. Lack of political interest
was asked in a direct fashion as well.
I presented the respondents with various evaluations of the European
Union, expecting them to discriminate between the national identity,
economic and political approaches. Factor analyses did not corroborate this
expectation. In Table 2 below I present the results from the factor analyses.
Three of the items that I included were not extracted by the factors at all. This
concerns the statements: ‘The European Union must pay more attention to
social problems’, ‘It’s fine for Turkey to become a member of the European
Union’, and ‘I am proud to be European’. As a result, they are carried forward
in the analysis as three loose items. Most of the other items are extracted by
one factor. The first factor binds the items on cultural threat, benefits, wasting
money and political distrust – I label this factor general Euroscepticism. The
second factor relates to Europe as one country and exchanging Dutch citizen-
ship for European citizenship. This factor has been labelled as opposition to
an EU super-state. The two factors have a 0.35 correlation. I will, however,
separate out the items from the general Euroscepticism scale to find out
whether some of these motives are better predictors of the ‘no’ vote than
others, differentiating the EU evaluations into the identity, utilitarian and
political approaches. Correlating all items concerning EU evaluations with
each other, the highest correlation is 0.40.
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Table 2 Factor analyses results on items on the European Union
F1 F2 H 2
The EU is a threat to Dutch culture .59 – .37
I am proud to be a European .31 – .11
I would like to exchange my Dutch citizenship for 
European citizenship .15 .54 .39
Europe should become one country without borders – .72 .57
It’s fine for Turkey to become a member of the 
European Union .21 .26 .16
The Netherlands derives no benefits from EU membership .57 – .38
The EU wastes a lot of money .55 – .28
Distrust of the European Parliament .77 – .56
The European Union must pay more attention to social 
problems – –.14 .02
Notes: F = factor loadings from the pattern matrix; H2 = communality. Only factor loadings > .10
are presented. All items are coded such that a high score indicates stronger Euroscepticism.
Italicized items do not fit into the solution. N = 787.
Source: Socon, 2005 (Eisinga et al., 2008).
Finally, I included party preference, broken down into the government
parties that led a ‘yes’ campaign (CDA – Christian-Democrats; D66 – 
Social-Liberal; and VVD – Liberals), the opposition parties in the ‘yes’ camp
(GroenLinks – Green Left; and PvdA – Social Democrat) and the parties in
the ‘no’ camp (CU – Conservative Christian; Wilders’ party – Populist right;
LPF – Populist right; SGP – Conservative Christian; and SP – Socialist). People
who did not indicate a party preference were included as a separate category.
All attitudes were standardized to make comparison of effects in the
logistic regression analyses possible. Table 3 presents the descriptive 
statistics.
Differences between social categories
I present the results from the logistic regression analyses in three models 
(see Table 4). In the first model, the differences between social groups are
shown in their voting against the European constitution versus voting for it.
In the second model the attitudes derived from the identity, utilitarian and
political approaches that have no direct evaluation of the EU are added. In the
third model I add the statements about the EU. In these consecutive models
we can also examine the extent to which attitudes explain the differences found
between the social groups in terms of the chances of their having voted against
the European constitution. All models were controlled for multicollinearity but
no violations of the model criteria could be found. To compare the presented
results with a model in which I included only attitudes that were factorially
distinguishable, I give those results in Appendix 2.
From the first model it turns out that education has a significant negative
effect on voting against the European constitution, as was also found in the
bivariate analyses of Van der Kolk and Aarts (2005). As educational level
increases, the chances of having voted against the European constitution
diminish. This effect conforms with my expectation, and it is the strongest
effect in the first model. In this model, where the intercept represents the logit
of the average on all variables and the reference categories with respect to the
categorized data, it is estimated that people with higher education (+2
standard deviations (SD)) fell just short of the majority voting ‘no’ (41.0%),
whereas for people with lower education (–2 SD) an estimated 82.8% voted
against. For income, no influence was found in this model, which also controls
for education. It is therefore not so much the level of one’s income as the level
of one’s education that reduces the chances of a ‘no’ vote.
The age of the respondents does make a difference. As age increases, the
chances of having voted against the constitution in the referendum decrease.
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Table 3 Descriptive statistics (before standardization)
Min. Max. Mean S.D.
Social-structural characteristics
Education z 1 7 4.34 1.71
Income z 1 5 2.88 1.30
Income unknown 0 1 0.11 0.32
Age z 18 70 46.86 14.22
Sex
Male 0 1 0.48 0.50
Denomination
Roman Catholic 0 1 0.19 0.39
Dutch Protestant Church 0 1 0.10 0.31
Other Protestant 0 1 0.10 0.30
Lived in another EU country 0 1 0.10 0.30
No. of EU countries visited < age 16 z 1 5 2.17 1.10
No. of EU countries visited > age 16 z 1 5 3.45 0.86
Identity attitudes
Positive attitude towards Netherlands z 1 5 3.91 0.93
Ethnic threat z 1 5 2.64 0.81
Cultural ethnic threat z 1 5 2.54 0.88
Negative attitude towards Muslims z 1 5 3.48 0.72
EU is cultural threat z 1 5 2.70 1.02
Against EU super-state z 1 5 4.03 0.90
Turkey should not become EU member z 1 5 3.41 1.13
Proud to be European z 1 5 2.62 0.92
Economic attitudes
Negative prospective economy evaluation z 1 5 3.01 1.05
Negative current economy evaluation z 1 5 2.19 0.91
Economic ethnic threat z 1 5 3.07 1.11
Netherlands derives no benefits from EU 
membership z 1 5 3.15 0.94
EU should become more social z 1 5 3.84 0.77
EU wastes too much money z 1 5 3.80 0.89
Political attitudes
Lack of political interest z 1 4 1.95 0.76
Distrust of Dutch parliament z 1 10 4.67 1.91
Distrust of EU Parliament z 1 10 5.52 1.92
General Euroscepticism z 1 5 3.16 0.70
Party preference
Opposition party with a ‘yes’ campaign 0 1 0.32 0.47
Party with a ‘no’ campaign 0 1 0.22 0.41
No preference 0 1 0.12 0.33
Notes: z = included in the analyses as standardized (z-scored) variable. N = 787.
Source: Socon, 2005 (Eisinga et al., 2008).
I found no significant differences between men and women. By contrast,
membership of a church is important. The emphasis that was placed in the
Dutch Bible belt on the widespread ‘no’ vote made it appear as if religious
people had voted against the constitution in larger numbers than the general
population. Based on my research, this view merits revision. In fact, it turns
out that Roman Catholics and members of the Protestant Church in the
Netherlands were much less likely to have voted ‘no’ than people who did
not consider themselves members of any church. However, the group
considering itself as belonging to another Protestant church was indeed more
likely to vote ‘no’ (although the difference from respondents who did not
consider themselves a member of any church is not significant, which could
be attributable to the relatively small size of the group).
Whether someone had visited other EU countries before his 16th birthday
reduces the chances of a ‘no’ vote – this result is in the expected direction,
although the effect is rather small. Moreover, we cannot ascertain in these
models whether this effect picked up socialization effects other than the
foreign experience.
Battle of explanations: Identity, utilitarian and 
political attitudes
In Model 2, I add the general attitudes that are derived from the identity
approach (positive attitude towards the Netherlands, perceived cultural ethnic
threat and negative attitude towards Muslims), from the utilitarian approach
(prospective and current economic evaluations and perceived economic ethnic
threat) and from the political approach (political interest and distrust of Dutch
politics). In this model, I also included trips abroad later in life – because this
may depend on attitudes – to find out whether these add to the attitudes in
explaining the ‘no’ vote. Concerning this final aspect I can be brief: even
though all ‘experience characteristics’ point in the direction of a more pro-
European vote in the referendum, none of them reaches significance.
The three attitudes from the identity approach all make a significant
contribution to voting ‘no’ in the referendum. People who are more proud to
be Dutch are significantly more likely to have voted ‘no’ in the referendum.
People who more strongly perceive a cultural ethnic threat are also more
likely to have voted against in the referendum on the European constitution.
The effect of cultural ethnic threat (B = 0.23) is a little larger than the effect
of being proud to be Dutch (B = 0.19). The effect of the negative attitude
towards Muslims is stronger (B = 0.37), implying that people with more
negative attitudes voted ‘no’ more often. The effect from distrust of the Dutch
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parliament is conspicuously stronger (B = 0.96), which could indicate the
existence of a second-order election effect. Lack of political interest has no
direct effect on voting behaviour. The same holds for the effects from the utili-
tarian perspective. Controlled for political and identity attitudes, whether
people evaluate their current or prospective economic situation negatively or
whether they perceive an economic ethnic threat is irrelevant for the vote in
the referendum. I would like to remark here that a negative economic evalu-
ation correlates with distrust of the Dutch parliament, cultural ethnic threat
and a negative attitude towards Muslims, providing evidence for the exist-
ence of possible indirect effects. Nevertheless, the results show that the
economic evaluations were not decisive in voting ‘no’ in the EU referendum.
I additionally calculated how much the different approaches contribute
to explaining the vote, comparing the loss of model fit by excluding the
relevant predictors. Dropping the economic evaluations does not lead to a
decreased model fit. Excluding the three identity attitudes results in a –2 log-
likelihood increase (indicating a worse model fit) of 30.5 (3 degrees of
freedom). Exclusion of the political attitudes increases the –2 log-likelihood
parameter by 77.5 (2 degrees of freedom), showing us that political attitudes
have the largest influence on the voting decision.
The influence of EU evaluations
In the third model, specific EU evaluations are added to the model. The
question can now be answered of whether these specific EU evaluations
predominantly explain the voting behaviour, or whether the general identity,
utilitarian and political attitudes do so. From the attitudes discussed in
Model 2, only Dutch pride and distrust of the Dutch parliament remain
significant. The latter effect decreased to 0.65, but it is still one of the strongest
predictors in the model. Based on this finding I support the idea that voting
in the referendum on the European constitution was affected by domestic
political evaluations, corroborating the notion of second-order election effects.
The total contribution of the specific EU evaluations is stronger. Except
for European pride, all EU evaluations linked to the identity approach
significantly contribute to explain the ‘no’ vote. First, people who perceive
a threat to Dutch culture from the EU more strongly are much more likely
to have voted ‘no’ (B = 0.66). This effect is the strongest in the model. People
who oppose the idea of a single European country – a European super-state
– are also more likely to have voted against the European constitution.
Finally, there is a separate effect from the evaluation of Turkey’s EU member-
ship. People opposing this membership voted ‘no’ more often in the
Lubbers Regarding the Dutch ‘Nee’ to the European Constitution 7 5
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referendum. These specific EU evaluations turn out to be more decisive in
the ‘no’ vote than the general identity attitudes, which have all turned
insignificant in this third model. Only the positive attitude towards the
Netherlands still has a significant effect.
There is no independent effect from the attitude that the EU wastes too
much money, whereas people who think that the Netherlands does not benefit
from EU membership are more likely to have voted against the EU consti-
tution (B = 0.33). Because the question was not framed in economic terms, I
believe the contribution of the economic approach through this statement is
somewhat overestimated. The widely held view by the respondents that the
EU should be more social in its policies does not contribute to explaining the
‘no’ vote. We saw this outcome in the bivariate analyses too. People who think
that the EU should devote more attention to social problems voted ‘no’ to the
constitution as often as people who do not hold that view. Thus, of those
people who strongly believe that the EU should become more social, ‘only’
60% voted against the constitution.
Distrust of both the EU Parliament and the Dutch parliament did the ‘yes’
camp little good. Remarkably, distrust of The Hague had just as strong an
effect on voting against the constitution as distrust of Brussels, showing us
that both European and domestic political evaluations played an important
role in the ‘no’ vote. The influence of preference for a political party in the
‘yes’ or ‘no’ camps is likewise strong. There is no government effect though,
as supporters for the opposition parties with a ‘yes’ campaign did not differ
from citizens who identify with the governing parties. Supporters of parties
that led a ‘no’ campaign have greater chances of having voted against in the
referendum on the European constitution, controlled for all the attitudes.
Hence, irrespective of their EU evaluation positions, they were likely to vote
as advocated by the party they support. In part, this could be the effect of a
changed party preference after the referendum. However, Van der Kolk and
Aarts (2005) demonstrated that the turnover of people who disagreed with
the party they had voted for before the referendum was not very large. By
the same token, had the EU question had a strong effect on voting prefer-
ences, that would also have meant that, as a result of the referendum, the
parties that had opposed the constitution would emerge as strong winners
afterwards. Even though this indeed happened one-and-a-half years later in
the 2006 elections, in the regional elections and polls up to a year after the
referendum (also the period in which the data were collected) it was particu-
larly the opposition Labour Party that campaigned for a ‘yes’ vote that won
the elections.
In this third model, it is the political approach that contributes most
strongly to explain the ‘no’ vote. Dropping the attitudes listed under the
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political approach decreases model fit by 79.8 (6 degrees of freedom). Exclud-
ing the identity variables decreases model fit by 60.9 (7 degrees of freedom).
Exclusion of the economic variables does so by 33.2 (6 degrees of freedom).
Explaining the effects of education and religion
The final step is to find out which attitudes chiefly explain the effects 
of education and religion. Because income turns out to have no direct
significant effect in the first model, this question concerning income has
become irrelevant. The rather strong effect from education in the first model
(B = –0.48) turns insignificant in the second model (B = –0.11) when the
general attitudes are included. In the final step, the effect of education is close
to zero (B = 0.02). This implies that attitudes explain the relation between
education and a ‘no’ vote. With the advanced Sobel test – using the macro
from Preacher and Hayes (2005) – multiple mediators can be accounted for
to calculate indirect effects, as well as relevant covariates. The original direct
effect from education is indeed statistically significantly mediated by the atti-
tudes. Results indicate that ‘EU is cultural threat’ accounts for 24% of the
indirect effect. Distrust of the Dutch parliament accounts for 15% of the
indirect effect, whereas distrust of the European Parliament accounts for 14%.
From the other mediators, the negative evaluation of Turkish membership,
the evaluation that the Netherlands does not benefit from membership, lack
of political interest and party preference from the ‘no’ campaign mediate the
effect from education significantly too. The conclusion is that the effect of
education is mediated in particular by the evaluation that the EU poses a
cultural threat. When summing the total mediation from the different
approaches, I have to conclude that the mediation is just slightly stronger
from the political attitudes compared with the mediation from the identity
attitudes.
Catholics and members of the Protestant Church in the Netherlands
(PKN), it turns out, vote mainly for the governing Christian Democrats, and
were therefore less likely to have voted against the constitution. Other Prot-
estants did vote ‘no’ in larger numbers, partly because they had a greater
tendency to align themselves with the more conservative Protestant parties,
the Christian Union and the SGP – parties that campaigned for a ‘no’. Of the
Catholics and members of the Dutch Protestant Church, 75% voted for a party
from the ‘yes’ camp. For the non-religious this percentage is 62%, and for
people who considered themselves members of another Protestant congre-
gation it is 31%. The Sobel test on the indirect effect of denomination indeed
shows that the overrepresentation of other Protestants among the ‘no’ voters
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is explained mostly by their support for a party from the ‘no’ camp and by
their stronger endorsement of the statement that Turkey should not become
a member of the EU. At the same time, these Christians have much stronger
trust in the Dutch government, tempering the effect somewhat. The smaller
likelihood of PKN members having voted ‘no’ in the referendum is explained
largely by their lower levels of distrust of the Dutch parliament and support
for a party from the ‘yes’ camp, as the Sobel tests indicate. The finding that
the effect from PKN members is greater in Model 3 than in Model 2 can be
attributed to more agreement from those Christians that Turkey should not
become a member. Finally, the smaller likelihood of Roman Catholics having
voted against the constitution is explained not only by their support for a
party in the ‘yes’ camp and lower levels of distrust of the Dutch parliament,
but also by their lower levels of distrust of the European Parliament.
I also analysed to what extent the general attitudes that had significant
effects in Model 2 are mediated by the specific EU evaluations. The percep-
tion that the EU poses a cultural threat accounts for 40% of the indirect effect
from cultural ethnic threat, followed by the evaluation that Turkey should not
become a member of the EU (19%). The fear of an EU super-state, distrust of
the European Parliament and the evaluation that there are no benefits for the
Netherlands from EU membership each account for 13% of the indirect effect.
The attitude towards Muslims is mediated primarily by the evaluation
of Turkey’s membership (30% of the indirect effect). Remarkably though,
distrust of the European Parliament accounts for an almost equally large
mediation (29%). Moreover, its effect is mediated by the opposition to an EU
super-state, the perceived cultural threat from the EU and the attitude that
the country does not benefit from membership.
Distrust of the Dutch parliament is related rather strongly to distrust of
the European Parliament, which takes up 48% of the indirect effect. Distrust
of the Dutch parliament is also related to the perceptions that the EU poses
a cultural threat and that the Netherlands does not benefit from membership
and to voting for a party that led a ‘no’ campaign.
Conclusions and discussion
I have shown that the threat to Dutch culture emanating from the European
Union constitutes one of the primary explanations for the ‘no’ vote in the
Dutch referendum on the treaty to establish a constitution for Europe. I
showed, in addition to the importance of political explanations, that the
identity approach is useful in explaining the referendum outcome – more so
than the economic approach. I also found that a perceived EU cultural threat
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is strongly associated with a perceived cultural threat from ethnic minorities.
The present findings are consistent with recent studies by McLaren (2001,
2002, 2006), De Vreese and Boomgaarden (2005), Hooghe and Marks (2005)
and Luedtke (2005) that show that Euroscepticism is to a large extent related
to attitudes towards immigrants. De Master and Le Roy (2000) use the term
‘xenophobia’ in their research. The term applies not only to immigrants and
asylum seekers, but also to the European Union and its influence. Further
research is needed to shed light on which specific elements of Dutch culture
this relates to. Does the threat that people perceive from further European
integration relate to Dutch peculiarities such as the soft-drugs policy or liberal
policies concerning homosexuals, abortion and euthanasia? If one wants to
create more goodwill towards the EU amongst the Dutch population, it must
be made clear that Dutch individuality will be maintained and it must be
explained how this will be achieved. Politicians – and not only Dutch poli-
ticians – face a difficulty in conveying this message. The groups that are most
likely to perceive a stronger threat from ethnic minorities or a cultural threat
from the EU also have the greatest distrust of The Hague and Brussels.
The evaluations of both the Dutch and European parliaments explain the
voting in the referendum. The finding that distrust of The Hague and Brussels
led to a ‘no’ vote in equal measure provides evidence for the existence of a
second-order election effect in addition to the specific EU evaluation, as has
been outlined by Garry et al. (2005).
My results furthermore support the hypothesis that political parties affect
people’s choices. Irrespective of the EU evaluations and general attitudes,
support for a party with a ‘no’ campaign increased the likelihood of voting
against the European constitution considerably. On the other hand, I found
no support for an additional ‘government’ effect. It did not matter whether
people supported a government party (all campaigning for a ‘yes’ vote) or
an opposition party in the ‘yes’ camp. I can now interpret the effect of
religious denomination. Religion played an important role in the vote for or
against the constitution. Catholics and members of the Dutch Protestant
Church more often followed the norm of the party they tend to support – the
governing CDA, which campaigned for a ‘yes’. Overrepresentation of other
Protestants among ‘no’ voters can be explained by their support for the
conservative confessional parties, which campaigned for a ‘no’.
The analysis of the Dutch referendum outcome also sheds light on
whether general attitudinal positions in the domains of identity, economics
and politics or specific EU evaluations were decisive for the vote. Although
these EU evaluations are affected by general attitudes – or at least associated
with them – my results show that the specific EU evaluations predicted 
the ‘no’ vote better than the general attitudes. Opposition to Turkey’s
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membership and the idea that one’s country does not benefit from member-
ship are important examples of specific evaluations that affected people’s
voting.
Some of the new explanations for voting in the referendum did not have
an additional effect. People’s experience of other countries in the EU – either
because they went there on vacation or lived there – did not affect their voting
behaviour significantly, even though all effects were in the expected 
direction. Moreover, the battle-cry of the left – that the EU is not social enough
– is broadly subscribed to amongst the Dutch population. Still, this view did
not lead people to vote against the constitution to any significant extent.
People who believe that the EU must become more social as well as those
who indicated the opposite voted against the constitution in equal measure.
The idea that the EU wastes too much money had no independent effect
either. This latter aspect turned out to be strongly correlated with other EU
evaluations. In general, it is hard to separate the EU evaluations. Even though
I estimated the effects simultaneously – without multicollinearity problems –
factor analyses showed that many of these issues form a single factor of
general Euroscepticism. It would be wise for future research to include more
items for each of the theoretical approaches (identity, economy and politics)
and to test this dimensionality again, because I find different effects of these
approaches. Other topics, such as fears of being swallowed by a polity that
is perceived as too big by citizens – in particular when a country is small –
and consequently opposition to ongoing expansion of the EU should be
accounted for as well. It is also of relevance to discriminate better between
specific policy evaluations and more general Eurosceptic attitudes, such as
the question of whether the country benefits from membership – often used
in research because of its presence in the Eurobarometer. This question – in
this research added to the economic attitudes – could capture more than
economic evaluations, even though its contribution in the voting model is
overruled by more specific identity and political evaluations.
Education turned out to be one of the strongest demographic predictors.
Its relation to the ‘no’ vote is interpreted best by the attitude that the EU
poses a cultural threat. Still, the political explanations also account for much
of the relation between education and voting ‘no’ in the referendum. Further-
more, it turned out that older people in particular were less likely to have
cast their vote against the European constitution. This effect was hardly
explained by the various attitudes included in the model. I suspect that the
older generation was to a greater extent socialized with the original rationale
for establishing the EU: to banish war from Europe forever. This is why I
expect age to represent a cohort effect.
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The (for many, unexpected) ‘nee’ from the Netherlands corresponds with
other changes the country has experienced in the 21st century. As the immi-
gration theme rose high on the social and political agenda and with it
questions concerning national identity, the Dutch retreated behind the dykes.
The related theoretical framework on national identity offers an explanation
for the ‘no’ vote. In future research, questions need to be answered about
which aspects of the national culture people fear to lose in the process of
further European integration and to what extent this is related to different
dimensions of Euroscepticism. In the past 15 years when the European citizen
has been introduced and the Union has witnessed large expansion, politicians
– and not just Dutch ones – face the challenge of clarifying not only what the
benefits from possible further (political) integration are but also what the
limits of this integration are.
Notes
1 This appendix is available at http://www.uni-konstanz.de/eup/issues.htm.
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